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Do unexpected events experienced by one line of business adversely affect other lines of business in diversified
firms? We use fine-grained data on the film industry in the United States to show that such contagion
frequently occurs when a distributor opens a film in theaters and concurrently releases an older title to home
video: Being exposed to a competitive threat – a period of unexpected volatility – in the theatrical market
at the time of a film opening leads the distributor to suffer a loss in sales on the concurrent home video
release. Further analysis revealed that managers responded to these competitive threats by intensifying the
advertising and promotion of their films in theaters, suggesting that they diverted resources and attention
away from home video. Our results therefore suggest that the effects of unexpected events do spread across
lines of businesses within firms and consequently that resource constraints may limit the ability of firms to
engage effectively in multiple markets.
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A recent stream of literature in macroeconomics has suggested that the uncertainty generated
by unexpected events – such as 9/11 or the eruption of Eyjafjallajo¨kull – can ripple through the
economy (Bloom 2009). Managers, suddenly uncertain of future sales, hold off on investing in
expanding capacity and inventories. That decision to delay investments and slow production, in
turn, reduces the demand for the firms that supply them, causing those suppliers to delay their
own investments and slow their own production (e.g., Alexopoulos and Cohen 2009, Bloom et al.
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2012). As these adjustments diffuse from one firm to the next, an unexpected event in one part
of the world or one segment of the economy can spread to other seemingly unaffected sectors and
regions, potentially leading to large-scale economic downturns (Bloom 2009).
We explore whether a similar dynamic might occur within firms. Of course, the mechanism
underlying this macroeconomic research suggests that one would expect contagion to occur within
vertically-integrated firms, as those organizations serve as their own suppliers. But we see reason
to expect that one would even see contagion in the effects of unexpected events across the units
of horizontally-diversified organizations. When firms span multiple lines of business, they typically
share resources across those businesses—at a minimum, in terms of managerial capacity and access
to financial capital. To the extent that addressing problems in one line of business requires the
organization to allocate a larger share of resources, at least temporarily, to the business experiencing
the unexpected event, it diverts resources away from these other lines of business, potentially to
their detriment (e.g., March and Simon 1958, Levinthal and Wu 2010).
Although these theoretical accounts seem compelling, it has nevertheless been difficult to demon-
strate empirically that unexpected events can indeed precipitate such contagion in performance.
At the macroeconomic level, it often remains nearly impossible to determine whether uncertainty
led to an economic slowdown because managers postponed investments or whether firms slowed
expansion in response to a recession (Bachmann et al. 2013). At the firm level, a similar issue
arises: If two lines of business experience downturns at the same point in time, does that represent
contagion or simply the fact that both businesses have been commonly affected by some change in
the external environment or in the internal operations of the firm?
To demonstrate that the effects of unexpected events can diffuse across the units of diversi-
fied firms, even to lines of businesses not directly affected by those events, and to explore the
micromechanisms underlying this transmission, we focused on a setting with unusually high-quality
and fine-grained data: the sales of movies both in theaters and in recorded formats (primarily
DVD) for home viewing, from 2000 to 2009. These data allowed us to isolate unexpected events
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that occurred external to the firm and in only one of the businesses in which the firms operated.
They also allowed us to estimate the effects of these events on the performance of the business
segments that did not experience them.
We estimated a differences-in-differences model, examining how the revenues associated with
movies released for sale in recorded formats for home viewing by a distributor concurrently exposed
to a competitive threat, an unexpected and rapid rise in volatility in the theatrical market – usually
due to the opening of a movie with unusual and extraordinarily-broad appeal – compared to those
associated with movies released for sale in the same week but by a distributor not exposed to this
volatility in the theatrical market. We found that exposure to volatility in the theatrical market
dramatically reduced the revenues associated with the titles being released concurrently for sale
in recorded formats. To the extent that these periods of uncertainty arose exogenously, moreover,
our estimates have a causal interpretation.
Those results, of course, do not explain why this transmission occurred. We therefore turned
to detailed data on the behavior of distributors in the theatrical market to explore how managers
allocated resources in response to these periods of high volatility. Distributors create copies of films
and deliver them to theaters and retailers but they also bear responsibility for promoting these
films. Examining these promotion efforts, we found that exposure to a rapid rise in volatility –
to a period of competitive threat – had strong positive effects on both the amount of advertising
spent by distributors and on the levels of soft promotion allocated to the films affected by these
competitive threats.1 To the extent that these distributors had finite resources – in terms of dollars,
connections, and managerial attention – these responses to volatility in the theatrical market would
have siphoned resources away from the promotion of home video releases.
Our research has at least two potential implications. First and foremost, to the extent that the
effects of unexpected events can diffuse horizontally, within firms, in addition to vertically from
buyers to suppliers, even seemingly isolated events might have the potential to ripple through the
economy to create widespread waves of volatility and economic slowdown. Economies may then
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vary in their fragility as a function of the connections across industries created by the firms that
operate in them. Second, the fact that adverse events in one line of business negatively affect other
businesses within the same firm points to a potential downside to broad scope: an impaired ability
to cope with crises and unexpected environmental conditions (March and Simon 1958).
Contagion
One of the primary reasons for organizations to span products, industries, and regions has been
that doing so allows them to share certain costs across these operations. Savings generally arise
for one of two reasons. On the one hand, factors of production may have indivisibilities (Penrose
1959). An organization, for example, might need to purchase an entire machine even if it cannot
use its full capacity. Or, a firm might need to hire someone full time, even if it could not keep
that person busy. On the other hand, the need for some resources occurs only intermittently or
inter-temporally (Eppen 1979). A fast food restaurant focused on burgers might use its kitchen
and dining space primarily for lunch and dinner. Or, a marketing team required to handle product
launches might have little to do between these events. Although conceptually distinct, as one moves
to coarser-grained time scales, these two sources of inefficiency look increasingly similar. When
firms can deploy these under-utilized assets to another line of business, they can often operate
more profitably than more focused rivals (Panzar and Willig 1981).
But with the efficient usage of these resources comes a reduction in slack—spare resources avail-
able for redeployment.2 That’s often true not just on a percentage basis but also in absolute terms.
Compare, for example, a manager who spends half of her time overseeing one line of business to
one who spends half of his time managing a similar business but also another quarter of it over-
seeing a second one. The first manager has twice as much unused capacity (and potentially several
times the amount of spare time relative to the scale of the operations being managed). Much of
the literature on organizational and financial slack has emphasized the importance of these spare
resources to the promotion of innovation and risk-taking (e.g., Nohria and Gulati 1996, Greve 2003,
Natividad 2013b). But slack also plays an important role in the day-to-day operations of the firm,
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allowing it to absorb and respond to periods of intensified competition, heightened uncertainty,
and environmental change (Thompson 1967, Hannan and Freeman 1977, Freeman and Hannan
1983). Businesses with broader scope therefore likely have a diminished ability to respond to these
intermittent and unexpected events.
But diversified firms need not maintain less slack than their more focused rivals for contagion to
occur, the process requires simply that these firms operate relatively efficiently. Particularly in the
short run, firms face tight resource constraints. Hiring, building interorganizational relationships,
and raising financial capital require time and effort. Because multiunit business have limited slack
– particularly within any given business unit – responding to intermittent events typically requires
those organizations to siphon human, social, and financial capital away from other lines of business.
That might mean reassigning personnel for a period of time or shifting a budget temporally to the
unit under duress. Unless these resources had been uselessly deployed, however, their reallocation
will have negative consequences for the lines of business from which they have been pulled, leading
to contagion in the crisis from the unit originally experiencing the adverse event to other parts of
the organization.
Although others have alluded to this idea (e.g., March and Simon 1958), empirical research on
this potential diadvantage of scope has been elusive. Perhaps the primary limitation has been the
availability of data. Testing this possibility of within-firm contagion as a response to unexpected,
intermittent events requires fine-grained data on at least two lines of business for a large number of
organizations, longitudinally, over some meaningful stretch of time. That requirement alone poses a
high hurdle. But one would also ideally want a setting in which only some organizations encounter
these unexpected external events. One can then compare the firms exposed to the unexpected
events to those not exposed to disentagle contagion from factors affecting all firms active in the
second line of business. Film distribution offers just such a setting.
Film Distribution
Film distributors engage in a range of activities from the financing of films, to the copying and
delivery of film reels and the promotion of films being shown in theaters, to the production and
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marketing of recorded media for home viewing (Vogel 2011). In terms of organizational structure,
many of the larger distributors maintain separate departments for theatrical exhibition and home
video – to negotiate contracts and to produce and distribute film reels and DVDs – but nearly all
maintain a single integrated marketing department that promotes products in both categories.
This setting has the unusual, but useful, feature that distributors do not engage the theatrical
market on a continuous basis. Their participation in it rather focuses on the periods following a
small number of product introductions, film openings. As a result, even within a given year and
even among the largest firms, distributors vary in the market conditions they experience depending
on when they happen to have films in theaters.
Data. We assembled data from a variety of sources and used the longest period available for
each analysis. Our information on the theatrical sales of films, covering 1985 to 2009, came from
the weekly sales reported in Variety, the leading industry newspaper. We purchased data on the
weekly sales of home video products, for 2000 to 2009, from Nielsen’s VideoScan, the leading source
for information on video sales.3 Our information on monthly advertising expenditures, covering
1995 to 2007, came from TNS, and we extracted weekly data on soft promotion activities from
IMDb, for the period 1985 to 2009. Table 1 provides summary statistics for the main variables
used in the analyses at the weekly, video-week, distributor-week, and distributor-month levels.
Periods of competitive threat. What might constitute an unexpected event in this setting?
Note that the success of any given film has always been viewed as uncertain (De Vany and Walls
2004); poor sales therefore constitute a common outcome. Firm-specific (or film-specific) levels of
sales may also reflect issues with the internal operations of the distributor rather than exposure to
unanticipated environmental conditions. A decline in the level of sales therefore does not represent
a plausibly exogenous event.
The overall distribution of sales across films – in terms of overall ticket sales and the relative
shares of those sales captured by the most popular films each week – by contrast, has been much
more stable over time. Moreover, as a property of the entire industry rather than of a single firm,
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs.
At the weekly level:
SD of box office revenue 5.29 2.84 0.39 23.56 1304
Number of opening films 7.33 3.59 0.00 23.00 1304
Number of large production budget openings 0.60 0.88 0.00 5.00 1304
Holiday 0.22 na 0.00 1.00 1304
SD of production budget of opening films 20.10 17.15 0.00 117.56 1304
SD of screen count of opening films 859.35 432.29 0.00 2136.88 1304
At the video-week level:
Video units sold (logged) 5.63 3.06 0.00 15.12 112320
At the distributor-month level:
Network TV advertising 1.29 3.82 0.00 34.74 8702
Spot TV advertising 0.51 1.55 0.00 24.91 8702
All TV and cable advertising 2.49 7.11 0.00 64.21 8702
At the distributor-week level:
Printed media cover pages 0.10 0.49 0.00 18.00 61565
Press interviews 0.12 0.55 0.00 17.00 61565
Live show appearances 1.18 3.63 0.00 181.00 61565
Notes: Standard deviations of box office revenue and of the production budgets for opening films,
and all of the advertising variables represent millions of 2009 dollars. Number of opening films
counts the number of films in their first week in theaters. Number of large production budget
openings counts the number of films with production budgets above the 90th percentile. Holiday
equals one for the weeks closest to the eight most important holidays in the United States. The
soft promotion variables on printed media cover pages, press interviews, and live show appearances
all represent simple counts.
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this volatility also appears arguably exogenous to any given distributor. We therefore focused on
the effects of unexpected, rapid increases in the volatility of theatrical movie sales—the variance
in theatrical ticket sales across films in a given week. These periods represent a departure from the
normal course of business and therefore one might expect managers in the industry to notice and
respond to them.
These increases in variation or volatility – what some might call second-moment shocks – have
some similarity to those examined in the macroeconomics literature (e.g., Bloom 2009). But they
differ in at least one important respect: Whereas the macroeconomics literature has in mind exoge-
nous factors that generate uncertainty about future demand at the level of the economy or at the
level of the industry as a whole, the rapid increases in volatility identified here arise from within the
industry, in the sense that they emerge from shifting preferences and product-level competition.
We therefore refer to these spells as “periods of competitive threat” because they upset the usual
competitive balance in the industry.
We first validated that these periods of competitive threat constituted unusual events, rather
than simply being part of the normal distribution of volatility over time. Using box office sales data
for all films shown in theaters between 1985 and 2009, Figure 1 plots the cross-sectional standard
deviations of film-level box office revenues over time in constant millions of 2009 dollars (i.e. for
each week, we calculated the standard deviation of revenues across films for that week). The chart
appears to reveal many large spikes, periods of unusually high volatility, occuring at irregular
intervals. To evaluate more systematically whether these periods of competitive threat represented
deviations from the underlying distribution, we calculated Barndorff-Nielsen and Shephard’s (2006)
statistical tests for jumps: the jump-linear test and the adjusted jump-ratio test. In essence, these
tests assess the odds that one would have observed spikes of this order and frequency if the data
represented draws from a normal distribution. The data reject the null of no jumps at the 5.1%
and 5.9% significance levels, respectively.
We defined as periods of competitive threat weeks in which the standard deviation of box office
revenue exceeded twice the median standard deviation of the times series.4 To assess the extent to
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which distributors might have been able to anticipate these periods of competitive threat (jumps)
and therefore to prepare for them, Table 2 reports descriptive regression estimates of the correlates
of the standard deviation of box office sales. Weeks with a holiday and with smaller numbers
of opening films and larger numbers of big budget films had higher variance. Variation in sales
also increased with the standard deviation of the production budgets of opening films, though
distribution companies probably do not have a good sense of this variation in production budgets
ex ante. Overall, however, these factors only explained about one-third of the overall variation.
We therefore suspect that many of these periods of competitive threat came as suprises to the
managers of distribution companies.
Empirical Strategy
We wished to estimate the effects of exposure to a period of competitive threat in the theatrical
market on performance in the home video market. Releases to home video therefore represented
the focal market in this analysis and the (home video) title-week served as the unit of observation.
We identified 3,288 feature films newly-released to home video between January 1, 2000, and
December 31, 2009, carried by 347 different distribution companies, and we focused on the sales
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Table 2 Linear Regression Estimates of Standard Deviation in Film-Level Sales
Model 2.1 Model 2.2
Number of opening films −0.220∗ −0.200∗
(−8.96) (−8.33)




SD of production budget of opening films 0.060∗
(7.66)
SD of screen count of opening films 0.000
(0.20)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes
R2 0.32 0.39
N (Weeks) 1304 1304
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses; * significant at the 1% level.
of these videos for the first 40 weeks following their release.5 Overall, our sample includes 151,680
video-week observations.
To estimate the effects, we used a differences-in-differences (diff-in-diff) empirical strategy. We
defined treatment at the film level. Being exposed to the treatment here meant that the release
of the film to home video occurred concurrent to its distributor opening a different feature film in
theaters during a period of competitive threat in the theatrical market. We essentially used two sets
of home videos to identify this effect: (i) those released during the same week but by distributors
not concurrently opening a feature film in the theatrical market, and (ii) those released during
non-competitive threat weeks, both by distributors simultaneously active in the theatrical market
and by those only releasing to home video. We therefore examined the difference in performance
between simultaneous releases and being active only in the home video market, and how those
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differences in turn differed according to whether the theatrical market had been experiencing a
period of unusual volatility.
Our primary analysis built on the specification proposed by Hendricks and Sorensen (2009),
which allows the investigator to estimate both the treatment effect and its persistence over time.
Consider each video, i, released to home video by distributor, d, in each of its life-cycle weeks, t,
in the home video market, where t runs from 1 to 40. We defined an indictor variable, Itd, denoting
treatment, to have a value of one when d experienced a period of competitive threat in the same
week that it released a title to the home video market (i.e. t = 0). Our baseline model therefore
estimates:
yit = α0 +
40∑
r=1





d× 1(week= r) + γItd + δXdt +αd + θt + it, (1)
where yit represents the logged sales of video i in week t, Xdt denotes a set of controls at the
distributor-week level, αd and θt represent, respectively, vectors of distributor and year-week fixed
effects, and it denotes a video-week specific error term. We measured performance in terms of
logged home video unit sales (plus one to avoid logging zero).6
Two features of this specification allow us to rule out a large number of competing interpretations
of the results. First, the models include distributor fixed effects (αd). Our results therefore effectively
account for any time-invariant differences across distributors. Second, the models incorporate two
different kinds of fixed effects related to time: Year-week fixed effects (θt) account for any common
factors influencing supply or demand during a particular week in a particular year, such as a school
holiday or unseasonable weather. Week-since-release indicator variables (λr) meanwhile flexibly
capture the typical time path of home video sales as a function of how long the video has been
available for purchase.
Note that this estimation approach effectively eliminates the possibility that some common factor
accounts for both the increased volatility in the theatrical market and any decline in home video
sales. Because our results are effectively within a particular week, both the treated and untreated
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home video releases should have been exposed to the same conditions in the home video market
(and therefore the year-week fixed effects should absorb these factors).
Bertrand et al. (2004) have noted the need for caution when multiple observations stem from
the same treatment in a diff-in-diff estimation. They therefore recommend clustering observations
sharing a common treatment. We adopted an even more conservative approach: Not only do sales
of the same video probably have correlated errors across weeks but also sales of different videos by
the same distributor may also have correlated residuals. We therefore estimated (1) using standard
errors clustered at the level of the distribution company.
Results
Our estimation generates 40 coefficients that jointly describe the effect of being treated—being
released by a distributor concurrently exposed to a period of competitive threat (high volatility)
in the film market. Given this large number of coefficients, we find it useful to display the results
graphically. Figure 2 plots the weekly coefficients along with the 95% confidence interval implied
by their standard errors. Films released to home video by distributors exposed to these unexpected
conditions in the theatrical market clearly suffered from lower sales, though this effect dissipates
over time—falling to zero after three to five weeks.
Table 3 reports and extends these results in table format. Model 3.1 reports the coefficient
estimates displayed in Figure 2. Note that, to hold the tables to a manageable length, we do not
report the point estimates for the effects of treatment for weeks 6 through 40. From the point
estimates, one can see that being released to home video by a distributor exposed to a period of
competitive threat has a large, and statistically significant, negative effect on sales. In the first
three weeks following the release to home video, films carried by treated distributors experienced
sales more than 75% lower than their untreated counterparts releasing home videos at the same
time.
Although the models include distributor-level fixed effects, one might nonetheless worry that the
results reflect some aspect of distributor product strategy. Model 3.2, however, demonstrates that
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Table 3 Differences-in-Differences Estimates of Effect of Theatrical Market Volatility on Home Video Sales
Volatility indicator Continuous variable
Model 3.1 Model 3.2 Model 3.3
Volatility treatment −0.075 −0.080 0.031∗
(−0.70) (−0.78) (3.50)
Volatility treatment × (Video week = 1) −0.873∗ −0.874∗ −0.211∗
(−4.15) (−4.09) (−6.83)
Volatility treatment × (Video week = 2) −0.996∗ −0.998∗ −0.211∗
(−5.05) (−4.95) (−6.63)
Volatility treatment × (Video week = 3) −0.753∗ −0.752∗ −0.123∗
(−3.69) (−3.62) (−4.33)
Volatility treatment × (Video week = 4) −0.307 −0.307 −0.093∗
(−1.33) (−1.32) (−4.02)
Volatility treatment × (Video week = 5) −0.068 −0.060 −0.077∗
(−0.33) (−0.29) (−4.27)
Interactions through (Video week = 40) Yes Yes Yes
Simultaneous release week dummy Yes Yes Yes
Distributor fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Size quartile dummies No Yes Yes
Genre variety quartile dummies No Yes Yes
Video week fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year-week fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.56 0.56 0.57
N (Video-weeks) 151680 151680 151680
Number of clusters (distributors) 347 347 347
Notes: t-statistics based on standard errors clustered by distribution company reported in parentheses; *
significant at the 1% level. This table reports estimates of equation (1). Only interaction coefficients for the
first five weeks have been reported for brevity. A graphical display of the full set of coefficient estimates
appears in Figure 2.
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Note: The plot displays the estimated coefficients for βr from equation (1) using the second column
of Table 3 as the specification. The dashed lines depict the 95% confidence interval for these
estimates.
the negative effect of treatment on sales persists even after adjusting for two time-varying features
of distributors: size and genre variety. Specifically, for each distributor, for each month, the models
included indicator variables for each quartile of the distributor size and genre variety distributions.
The inclusion of these controls, however, had no meaningful effect on the observed relationship
between performance and being released by a distributor concurrently exposed to a competitive
threat in the theatrical market.
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Finally, Model 3.3 examines the robustness of the results to the use a continuous variable for
periods of competitive threat. In other words, instead of defining these periods in terms of binary
(1/0) jumps that exceed two standard deviations in the distribution of theatrical box office volatil-
ity, these models use a continuous treatment variable: the standard deviation of theatrical box
office sales for distributors concurrently promoting films in theaters. The results appear robust and
similar in magnitude in this alternative specification.
Although these models demonstrate that treated films – those distributed by firms concurrently
releasing films to the theatrical market during a period of competitive threat – experienced a
temporary decline in sales performance, one cannot say for certain from this analysis whether
this decline represented “lost” sales. Note that the point estimates for the effect of being exposed
become positive – though generally insignificant – in weeks 6 through 40. These results might
therefore simply reflect time-shifting in when the video sales occur.
To determine the long-run effect of treatment, Figure 3 integrates the week-to-week coefficients
over time, illustrating the cumulative effect of treatment at the end of each week. One can clearly
see the dip in sales that occurs during the first three weeks following home video release. Although
the gap between these two lines begins to narrow from the fourth week of the release into home
video, the two lines do not converge, suggesting that distributors never recover these lost sales.
Overall, home videos released at the same time that the distributor faces a competitive threat in
the theatrical market sell about 30% less during their first forty weeks.
Alternative Counterfactual. Although our primary specification controls quite well for the
conditions in the home video market, it relies on the combination of two events to form the
treatment: simultaneous participation in the theatrical market and a jump in volatility in that
market. One might therefore worry that the negative effects on home video releases stem simply
from simultaneous participation in the theatrical market rather than as a response to a competitive
threat in that market. Recall that the diff-in-diff specification includes a separate intercept for
simultaneous release and therefore captures the main effect of being active in both markets, but
one might worry that simultaneous release interacts with one or more of the other controls.
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NOTES: For each week w, the plot displays the cumulative response oˆ= β1 +β2 + · · ·+βw for w=1
through 40 from equation (1), using the second column of Table 3 as the specification. The thick
red line plots the cumulative sales for home video titles released by distributors simulataneouly
exposed to a period of high volatility in the theatrical market, while the thin blue line depicts the
cumulative sales for those released by distributors not exposed to these unexpected events. The
associated dashed lines depict the 95% confidence intervals for these estimates
We explored this possibility by creating an alternative counterfactual. Instead of including home
videos released in the same week of the same year to help establish the baseline, we focused only
on distributors simultaneously releasing a film in the theatrical market. We therefore compare
those distributors that simultaneously released the two during a “normal” period to those that
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do so during a period of competitive threat. Because this approach restricts us to instances of
simultaneous release, we lose a substantial amount of statistical power, retaining only 1,395 cases
(less than 50% of those in our primary analysis). Also, because the alternative counterfactual
requires us to draw the treated and untreated films from different weeks, the models cannot include
fixed effects for the year-week (because the treatment variable does not vary across distributors
within a week). The combination of having fewer cases and no adjustments for seasonality also
limits our ability to trace the persistence of the effect. Instead, we simply estimated a model for
the average effect of being exposed to a period of competitive threat.
The results of these models using the alternative counterfactual appear in Table 4. Although
these models suggest somewhat smaller effect sizes, with home videos released simultaneously by
distributors during periods of competitive threat selling roughly 20% less than those released simul-
taneously by distributors during normal conditions, the models using this alternative specification
– controlling more precisely for simultanous participation in both markets but less precisely for
seasonality and conditions in the home video market – also point to a contagion in the effects of
volatility in the theatrical market to performance in the home video market.
Responding to Volatility
Although our results demonstrate that the performance of films in home video depends on whether
the distributors carrying those films must simultaneously contend with releasing other films in
theaters during a period of competitive threat, the analysis above provides limited insight into the
mechanisms underlying this result. To explore these issues further, we therefore analyzed additional
microdata on the behavior of these firms in the theatrical market.
How would one expect managers to respond to sudden increases in the volatility of their environ-
ments? One stream of literature suggests that uncertainty should lead to inaction. When managers
do not know whether the market will expand or contract, waiting until the future seems more
foreseeable frequently has an option value (e.g., McDonald and Siegel 1986, Dixit 1989). Another
stream of literature, meanwhile, suggests that uncertainty spurs action (March and Simon 1958).
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Table 4 Linear Regression Estimates of Effect of Theatrical Market Volatility on Home Video Sales (for
Subsample of Distributors Simultaneously Active in Both Markets)
Model 4.1 Model 4.2 Model 4.3
Volatility treatment −0.225∗∗ −0.212∗∗ −0.212∗
(−2.22) (−2.10) (−1.68)
Size quartile dummies No Yes Yes
Genre variety quartile dummies No Yes Yes
R2 0.00 0.03 0.03
Sample size 1396 1396 1396
Number of clusters (year-week) 461
Notes: t-statistics based on robust standard errors (clustered by year-week in Model 4.3) reported
in parentheses; **,* significant at the 5% and 10% level.
Worried about how changes in the environment might threaten the profitability of the firm or one’s
position within it, managers rally to respond to the perceived crisis.
Arguments for inaction generally rely on a notion of rational action. In the presence of adjustment
costs, managers increase the expected profitability of their firms by postponing capital investments
during periods of uncertainty. By waiting until the environment becomes more orderly, they avoid
investing in assets that might have little long-run value (McDonald and Siegel 1986, Dixit 1989,
Bloom 2009). Even in the absence of these adjustment costs, volatility implies noise. Responding
to this noise as if it represented a signal has the similar disadvantage of engaging in actions and
developing routines that fail to fit the future environment (Levitt and March 1988, March 1991).
Consistent with these ideas, firms that adapt more slowly perform better during times of turbulence
(Sorenson 2003).
Arguments for action meanwhile focus on agency issues – managers worrying more about their
own jobs than the profitability of their firms – or on emotional susceptibility or on risk aversion
on the part of managers. Thompson (1967), for example, argued that managers actively structure
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their organizations to reduce uncertainty. Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) similarly portrayed managers
as changing the boundary of the firm primarily to bring uncertainty under their control, thereby
reducing it. Rapid change and its concomitant uncertainty, moreover, has often been seen to spur
organizations into action rather than resulting in increased inertia (e.g., Miles and Snow 1978,
Smart and Vertinsky 1984).
Evidence exists for both responses. We would nonetheless note that, empirically, the effects found
appear to depend on at least one crucial aspect of the nature of the uncertainty. Evidence for
managers favoring inaction has generally come from situations in which the uncertainty concerns
the overall level of demand in the economy (e.g., Bloom 2009, Bloom et al. 2012). By contrast, many
of the studies suggesting that it promotes action stem from uncertainty concerning the relative
position of a firm in the industry (e.g., Koberg 1987, Sawyerr 1993).
It would therefore appear that a crucial element distinguishing between these two responses may
be the extent to which the uncertainty engenders status anxiety on the part of managers. Whereas
a general downturn affects everyone and therefore no one need worry about being singled out,
uncertainty about the strength of particular positions within the industry leads managers to worry
about their relative ranking among rivals and probably also their jobs. Given that our measure of
periods of competitive threat (uncertainty) captures within-industry variation in demand, these
prior findings would lead us to expect that managers in this setting would respond to volatility
with action.
Note that either action or inaction could lead to contagion. Regardless of how managers respond,
these periods of competitive threat absorb managerial attention, distracting personnel away from
other lines of business (March and Simon 1958, Penrose 1959). To the extent that managers respond
by allocating resources as well as attention to the crisis, then one would expect their actions to
produce even stronger contagion as they pull both managerial attention and human, social, and
financial capital away from other parts of the firm (Levinthal and Wu 2010).
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Promoting Films
In addition to producing and delivering copies of films to theaters and retailers, distributors also
bear primary responsibility for the promotion of the films that they carry. Interestingly, these
promotion activities represent one of the few dimensions on which distributors could respond to
a changing competitive landscape. Distributors can buy additional advertising time and space on
short notice or reallocate purchased slots across films. They can also exploit outlets – such as
television news, magazines, and newspapers – with daily and weekly production cycles. By contrast,
budgets for movies already in production remain fixed, and release dates for these films get set
months ahead. Although distributors might shift their selection of films in the future, the lag
between these other actions and any effect that it would have on performance stretches to eighteen
months or more given the production cycle for a feature film.
Much of the promotion in the film industry occurs through traditional advertising channels—
billboards, posters, television commercials, print ads in magazines and newspapers, and (increas-
ingly) online. But distributors also put a great deal of effort into securing other forms of promotion
(Hirsch 1972): They pitch producers to place the director or stars of their movies on talk shows;
they lobby the editors and staffs of magazines to run stories about the film or its actors; and they
encourage critics to write (positive) reviews. We refer to these non-advertising marketing activities
as soft promotion.
The literature on the production of culture has long noted the importance of these soft promo-
tion activities across a variety of entertainment industries (e.g., Hirsch 1972, Peterson and Berger
1975). In books, for example, publishers try to influence critics to review particular titles so that
readers become aware of them. Perhaps the most extensive research has been done in music, where
encouraging disc jockeys to play songs helps to stimulate demand for records (Peterson and Berger
1975, Rossman 2013) Soft promotion also plays an impotant role in the film industry, though it
has received less academic attention in that context.
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Empirical Strategy
To analyze the effects of exposure to periods of competitive threat in the theatrical market on the
marketing activities of distributors during these periods, we built two additional panel data sets
describing the behavior of distributors in the theatrical market.
Advertising. Our data on advertising cover films released from 1995 to 2007, and we use the
distributor-month as the unit of observation.7 We considered three different types of advertising
expenditures: advertising on network television (ABC, CBS, NBC, Fox , UPN and WB), spot
television advertising, and total television advertising (the sum of spot advertising, advertising
on network television, cable, and advertising through syndication). In all cases, these variables
represent millions of dollars. To focus the analysis, we only included distributor-months four months
prior to the release of a film and two months after the release. Thus, for example, a distributor
that only released one film on the theatrical market in a given year would have six monthly records
associated with it. The larger and more active distributors nevertheless appear almost continuously
throughout the observation period.
For each distributor, we sorted all films released into two mutually-exclusive and exhaustive
categories: films exposed to a period of competitive threat (which we called “treated” films) and
films not exposed to such a period (labeled “non-treated” films). For each distributor-month obser-
vation, we summed the advertising expenditures for that month separately across all treated and
all non-treated films.
To control for a variety of firm-specific and time-varying variables, our models included fixed
effects for distributors, distributor-month size quartiles, distributor-month genre variety quartiles,
and year-month periods. Volatility treatment, an indicator variable equal to one for films exposed
to a period of competitive threat, represented the primary coefficient of interest. Note that this
variable only switched on after the film had been exposed to a jump in volatility. In other words,
this variable retained a value of one even for films eventually exposed to a period of competitive
threat up to the week in which that jump in volatility actually occurred. We therefore estimated
the contemporaneous effect of a period of competitive threat on the actions pursued by distributors
on the projects directly affected by this period (treated films).
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Soft Promotion. We also built an analogous data set for soft promotion but with the
distributor-week (rather than the distributor-month) as the unit of observation. Because IMDb
has recorded this information over a longer period, this analysis covers films released between 1985
and 2009. We analyzed three types of soft promotion: the count of covers related to the movie
in printed media (e.g., magazines), the number of interviews of cast and crew in printed media,
and the count of live television show appearances. Again, to focus the analysis, we only included
distributor-weeks for 16 weeks prior to the release of a film and for eight weeks after the release.
The other steps of constructing and analyzing these data followed that for advertising expendi-
tures. We again sorted films into treated and non-treated and summed the counts across these two
categories for distributors for each week. Our models included an analogous set of fixed effects and
defined the variable of interest in the same way.
Results
Table 5 reports the results of our analysis of the monthly advertising data. The estimates in the
first column indicate that exposure to a period of competitive threat led distribution companies
to increase their investments in network television advertising, relative to the level that they had
been investing immediately prior to this threat. In total, distributors exposed to the competitive
threat raised their ad spending by nearly $1 million on average.
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The next two models split the analysis according to whether the films being advertised experi-
enced the period of competitive threat. One can see that the increase in investment occurs entirely
on the films exposed to the period of competitive threat, by nearly $1.6 million on average. By
contrast, distributors appeared to reduce their advertising expenditures on the films not affected
by the volatility (by nearly $600,000). Since these films generally have not yet been released, it
appears that distributors responded to periods of competitive threat by shifting advertising dollars
from future releases to those currently in theaters. Contagion therefore may not just spill poor
performance over into the home video market but also into future releases in the theatrical market.
Note, however, that network advertising represents just one component of the overall advertising
of films. Models 5.4 through 5.9 demonstrate that similar effects occurred across all other categories
of advertising. In terms of overall expenditures on television advertising, Models 5.8 and 5.9 suggest
that distributors raised their ad spending on films exposed to periods of competitive threat by
more than $3 million, apparently pulling some of those resources (about $1.4 million) from future
releases and some of this money from elsewhere. To put these numbers in perspective, the median
film in our sample would have had an advertising budget of around $20 million (Vogel 2011)—
across print, billboards, television, trailers and all other forms of promotion. Perhaps as much as
90% of this budget, moreover, gets spent prior to the release of a film (Elberse and Anand 2007),
meaning that the typical film might have a post-release advertising budget of less than $2 million.
Distributors therefore appear to react quite dramatically, increasing their post-release advertising
by more than 100%, in response to a period of competitive threat.
Our analyses of soft promotion, reported in Table 6, tell a similar story. The first column reports
the effects of exposure on the number of magazine covers. Although the overall number of covers
does not vary with exposure to a period of competitive threat, Models 6.2 and 6.3 again suggest a
shifting, with more covers being allocated to the films experiencing the competitive threat and fewer
being devoted to future films. Again, the effects appear large. To put these values in context, the
average film in our sample appeared on only 0.1 magazine covers, thus exposure to a competitive
threat increased soft promotion in this category by more than 50%.
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We observed similar patterns for the other forms of soft promotion. Consider first the number
of press interviews. Overall, the number of interviews increased in response to periods of competi-
tive threat, perhaps because distributors begin pushing these interviews more aggressively during
these periods. Models 6.5 and 6.6, moreover, again point to a reallocation of resources, with inter-
views being shifted to the films exposed to the periods of competitive threat at the expense of
future releases. Appearances by stars on television talk shows, such as the Late Show with David
Letterman, followed the same pattern.
Across all of these variables we would note that the magnitudes of the positive effects – increased
effort and expenditure – associated with the treated films exceeded those of the negative effects
associated with the untreated ones. To the extent that distributors have finite financial and orga-
nizational resources, therefore, these resources must come from somewhere. Our contagion results
suggest that distributors not only cannibalize future films but also resources that otherwise would
have gone to the promotion of concurrent releases in the home video market.
Discussion
We examined the extent to which firms transmit crises from one line of business to another. The use
of highly granular data on film distribution companies and the population of feature films released
in the theatrical and home video markets between 2000 and 2009 allowed us to examine the extent
to which unexpected competitive conditions in the theatrical market affected the performance of
films released by the same distributors in the home video market. We found strong evidence of
contagion: Films being released in home video by distributors concurrently exposed to a period of
competitive threat on the theatrical market – a time of unexpected volatility in sales – experienced
much lower sales than films being released to home video at the same time but by distributors not
exposed to the threat.
Further investigation of the behavior of the distributors active in the theatrical market pointed
to a reallocation of limited resources as the source of this contagion. In response to being exposed
to an unusual level of volatility in the theatrical market, distributors allocated large levels of
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additional resources, both financial and non-financial, to shoring up the promotion of the affected
films. Although some of this increased allocation appeared to come from the cannibalization of
resources that might otherwise have been used to promote future films, this shifting of resources
within the theatrical distribution business did not fully offset the additional resources devoted to
responding to the competitive threat. At least some of these financial and non-financial resources,
therefore, appear to have been pulled away from other lines of business, such as home video.
Our results have at least three important implications. Most directly, they suggest that dis-
tributors in the film industry might benefit from coordinating their theatrical and recorded home
video releases—so that they do not try to do both concurrently. But that strategy has limits. As
distributors release more and more films, they eventually reach the point where they are always
involved in some release.
In this respect, our results also have implications for the relationship between organizational
scope and performance, suggesting that finite managerial attention, human resources, and social
capital may place fundamental limits on the ability of firms to expand. To some extent, such a
suggestion might seem surprising. After all, as organizations expand, they also build resources and
capacity and they develop routines and an infrastructure for coordinating activities across the firm
(Helfat and Peteraf 2003). However, while the development of routines can allow organizations
with broad scope to operate effectively on a day-to-day basis, those routines cannot guide the firm
through poorly-understood periods.
Much of the advantage of combining multiple lines of business within a single firm stems from
the sharing of assets and resources (Penrose 1959, Teece 1982, Natividad 2013a). Such sharing
improves efficiency by eliminating excess capacity and organizational slack (Penrose 1959, Panzar
and Willig 1981), but that very efficiency also leaves firms vulnerable (e.g., Hannan and Freeman
1977, Freeman and Hannan 1983). When unexpected conditions arise, managers must allocate
attention and organizational resources to dealing with those surprises. In multiunit firms, that
attention and those resources come at the expense of other units, thereby potentially transmitting
the crisis from one business unit to others.
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Although others have alluded to this potential disadvantage of broad scope (e.g., March and
Simon 1958, Penrose 1959, Levinthal and Wu 2010), little empirical evidence has been offered for
its existence and our understanding of the micro-mechanisms through which it might occur remains
limited. Our analyses therefore provide some of the first systematic empirical evidence for this
supply-side source of diseconomies of scope.
Finally, our results may also have interesting implications for the dynamics of industries and
economies as a whole. Bloom (2009) has demonstrated that managers – by responding to crises
through a “wait-and-see” response, through inaction – may exacerbate the effects of destabilizing
events on the economy as a whole. By postponing changes in personnel, managers slow produc-
tivity growth by not reallocating people to positions where they could produce more value. And,
by postponing capital investments, managers effectively transmit uncertainty regarding demand
in their own industry to the firms that would have been suppliers for those investments. Those
suppliers then, in turn, may forgo hiring and their own capital investments. Contagion therefore
can lead temporary increases in uncertainty to produce economy-wide downturns.
Interestingly, managerial action, in this case in response to within-industry rather than economy-
wide events, may also lead to the deleterious diffusion of volatility through the economy. In diver-
sified firms, periods of competitive threat in one part of the organization may lead those firms to
divert scarce resources and managerial attention away from other divisions, thereby potentially
disrupting the dynamics of those industries as well. Contagion therefore could again spread across
sectors of the economy. However, whereas Bloom (2009) suggests that these disruptions would
travel vertically through buyers and suppliers, resource reallocation would point to disruptions
diffusing horizontally across the industries that diversified firms span.
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Endnotes
1Distributors engage in a range of activities to promote a film. They may, for example, encourage
magazines to carry stories about a movie or pitch directors and stars as potential guests for talk
shows (Hirsch 1972). We refer to these activities as “soft promotion” to distinguish them from
money spent on advertising.
2Those familiar with the ecological literature on specialism and generalism might feel that this
claim runs counter to the arguments made there (Hannan and Freeman 1977, Freeman and Hannan
1983). But having more slack resources in that literature definitionally implies that an organization
has pursued a generalist strategy. Slack does not come from having a broader range of operations.
According to that line of reasoning, then, one would classify firms that span lines of business and
exploit economies of scope across those businesses as specialists. Consistent with the implications
of that theory, specialists (in our case, firms exploiting economies of scope) with lower levels of
slack find themselves more vulnerable to environmental change.
3VideoScan assembles sales data by surveying a large sample of retail outlets, such as Target and
Tower Records, on a weekly basis. It does not include the sales of recorded video to firms that then
rent those tapes or discs to consumers. In total, the VideoScan data detail unit sales for each of
166,037 video titles – including feature films, television series, and made-for-television films – on a
weekly basis from January 1, 2000, to December 31, 2009.
4We also estimated all of our main models using a continuous measure of volatility—the standard
deviation of box office revenues across films within a given week (see Table 3).
5The home video market has changed even across this decade. For example, in 2000, the average
home video release occurred roughly 40 weeks after the film’s theatrical opening but by 2009 this
lag had shrunk to 18 weeks. To determine whether any of these changes influenced our results, we
split the sample into two halves and estimated the models within each half. Although the effects
appeared slightly smaller in the more recent period, none of the differences in the coefficients
reached a p≤ .05 significance level.
Natividad and Sorenson: Contagion in the multiunit firm
30 Article submitted to Organization Science; manuscript no. OS-MS-14-7927
6The addition of this constant has little effect as the median title sold 119 copies in each of its first
40 weeks. Only 7% of observed title-weeks had sales of zero.
7TNS only records advertising expenditures at a monthly level. We therefore could not analyze
variation in advertising from week to week.
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